

Enhanced end-use monitoring report exposes Ukraine oversight failures

Background: A recent Department of Defense Inspector General report “undermines two years of lavish assurances from the administration that rigorous monitoring would keep U.S. military aid given to Ukraine from being misused [...] despite the country’s longstanding reputation for corruption,”¹ as the Associated Press put it on January 11.

DOD IG Report: The January 2024 report, the latest in a series of government watchdog publications on shortcomings in monitoring U.S. aid to Ukraine, documents the failures of both the Biden administration and the Ukrainian Armed Forces to properly track U.S.-supplied weapons.² Its focus is on enhanced end-use monitoring (EEUM), a designation reserved for weapons that “incorporate sensitive technology,” are “particularly vulnerable to diversion or other misuse,” or “whose diversion or other misuse could have serious consequences.”³

The report found that \$1.005 billion out of \$1.699 billion worth of EEUM-designated weapons sent to Ukraine—a staggering 59 percent of the total value—“remained delinquent,” i.e., were not tracked according to DOD standards.⁴

Bottom line: **Claims of radical transparency and tracking of U.S. weapons in Ukraine are simply not accurate.** Assertions that “there is no evidence of illicit transfer of EEUM defense articles provided to Ukraine” sidestep the reality that an accurate, up-to-date inventory of U.S.-supplied weapons in Ukraine—which the DOD IG report demonstrates that the U.S. does not have—is necessary to determine whether weapons have fallen into the wrong hands.⁵ The DOD IG found that while revised inventory processes have “contributed to an improved delinquency rate,” “significant personnel limitations and accountability challenges remain.”

Report highlights:

1. **The Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) and U.S. personnel failed to keep track of key defense articles, severely limiting the ability to determine whether these were misused or stolen.** The report found that the UAF “did not provide expenditure reports by serial number” to U.S. personnel—reports that enable the U.S. to track which weapons have been lost or destroyed in battle.⁶ Worse, the UAF also failed to inventory durable U.S.-supplied defense articles designated for EEUM. This includes valuable equipment that can be reused to fire weapons and that, the report notes, “should still be currently active in Ukraine.” UAF personnel had not inventoried *any* of the 68 Stinger gripstocks

¹ Ellen Knickmeyer, “The US failed to track more than \$1 billion in military gear given Ukraine, Pentagon watchdog says,” *Associated Press*, January 11, 2024. Available at: <https://apnews.com/article/ukraine-weapons-audit-watchdog-us-congress-biden-9abecd14528b9551ff4ddb6786ad7fda#>.

² Department of Defense Inspector General, “Evaluation of the DoD’s Enhanced End-Use Monitoring of Defense Articles Provided to Ukraine,” January 10, 2024. Available at: https://media.defense.gov/2024/Jan/11/2003374323/-1/-1/1/DODIG-2024-043-EEMU_REDACTED%20SECURE.PDF.

³ *Ibid* at 1.

⁴ *Ibid* at i.

⁵ *Ibid* at 68.

⁶ *Ibid* at 28.

or 61 Javelin CLUs included in a DOD IG sample. U.S. personnel in Ukraine inventoried no Stinger gripstocks and only 8 of the Javelin CLUs.⁷ These are missile launchers that ill-willed actors could conceivably use to target commercial aircraft; the U.S. has a strong interest in ensuring they do not fall into the wrong hands.

2. **U.S. personnel on the ground could not keep up with the volume of weapons streaming into Ukraine and failed to keep an accurate, timely record of them.** There were limited personnel in Ukraine and partner nations to take inventory of U.S.-supplied weapons before they were sent to the front lines. It has been suggested that, in some cases, those U.S. personnel that were present were scrambling to record weapons' serial numbers using paper and pen. It was only in September 2022—more than six months after Russia's invasion—that a less fallible barcode scanner system was finally introduced.⁸
3. **There was no live, comprehensive database of equipment sent to Ukraine, and systemic failures inhibited the proper validation of reports of lost or expended equipment.** According to the report, “before the full-scale invasion in February 2022, [DOD regulations] required [U.S. personnel in Ukraine] to conduct an initial inventory of EEUM-designated defense articles within 90 days of entering Ukraine and annually thereafter.”⁹ But inputs of data were often significantly delayed, both from U.S. personnel and the UAF; the report states that the former “did not enforce requirements that the UAF provide loss reports in a timely manner.”¹⁰ The DOD IG also noted “a lack of internal controls for validating data” in DOD's database and found that DOD “did not maintain an accurate inventory” of EEUM-designated defense articles sent to Ukraine.¹¹
4. **EEUM procedures were not designed for use in war zones like Ukraine, and were thus less effective in ensuring oversight of U.S.-supplied weapons.** There were no official procedures for conducting EEUM in a hostile environment like Ukraine's until December 2022—more than nine months after this latest iteration of the Ukraine-Russia conflict began.¹² The report notes that DOD “did not fully comply with the EEUM program requirements for defense article accountability in a hostile environment.”¹³

⁷ Ibid at 29.

⁸ Ibid at 9.

⁹ Ibid at 15.

¹⁰ Ibid at 15.

¹¹ Ibid at i.

¹² Defense Security Cooperation Agency, “Conducting End Use Monitoring in a Hostile Environment, DSCA Policy 22-87 [SAMM E-Change 609],” December 20 2022. Available at: <https://samm.dsca.mil/policy-memoranda/dsca-22-87>

¹³ Department of Defense Inspector General, “Evaluation of the DoD's Enhanced End-Use Monitoring of Defense Articles Provided to Ukraine,” January 10, 2024. Available at: https://media.defense.gov/2024/Jan/11/2003374323/-/1-11/DODIG-2024-043-EEMU_REDACTED%20SECURE.PDF..